Garth Groff wrote:

Tim and Ed,

This discussion is interesting, but these figures you cite seem to apply
to a whole railroad. None of us are in a position to model a whole
railroad (except perhaps a small shortline), or rarely even more than a
small section of a railroad's busiest route. While useful, I suggest
these figures can't be accurately applied in most cases because the type
of traffic on one section of a large railroad will vary considerably
from another route of the same company. Car mix on any line is dependent
upon types of industries and the interchange points on that line, and
might be quite different from the company's overall figures.This
suggests that photographic evidence and company records (conductors'
books, wheel reports, switch lists) are more useful than company-wide
averages. For example, the SP's Sunset Route would carry a very
different mix of cars than say their Coast Line. Comments?

Garth,

Agree with your statements about the different car mixes in various
"divisions" of a railroad. In STMFC message #29444, I outlined a method
to determine what the appropriate car mixes on a branch line around 1950.

Often, however, a RR company's data is only for the whole. On Sept. 4th,
2001 before I became a STMFC member, I wrote a piece GENERAL
CHARACTERISTICS AS DEFINED BY THE OPERATING STATISTICS OF LARGE STEAM
RAILROADS - 1947-1955 which I have copied below. I suggested rather than
using the data from large railroads, use the data from smaller roads
which were dominated by their originating traffic like the DM&IR, and
N&W; or receiving traffic like the LIRR or B&A; or serving as a bridge
line such as the CNO&TP and Cotton Belt. I have not reviewed it for a
while, but I think I can stand by a large part of the analysis - the
piece was written before I got into parsing wheel reports and knowing
better the differences in the percent loaded car miles of different car
types. Maybe, by re-releasing it now, others can have the chance to take
pot shots at it. Who knows maybe I will agree with the pot shots.

Tim Gilbert

Bill (Jewett),

Of course, UP (and PRR, I suppose) must be the typical American

railroad in many ways;

There was no such thing as a "typical" railroad for that would imply the
"typical" railroad to be merely the "average" railroad. So what you
really mean may be better phrased as a "multi-dimensional" railroad. So
let's explore a few of the statistical averages of a few
multi-dimensional railroads with the National average in 1947 and note
the differences between them. (I like to use 1947 because that year
combined civilian traffic with hardly any freight car surpluses.)

1947 AVG RR PRR NYC SOU UP AT&SF
% Car Miles Loaded 66.4% 66.9% 64.5% 70.2% 66.5% 67.6%
" - Eastbound 76.0% 81.6% 84.5% 83.9% 72.8% 69.0%
" - Westbound 56.9% 52.1% 45.7% 56.6% 60.3% 66.3%

% Loaded Car Mi - East 57.1% 61.2% 63.5% 59.7% 54.7% 50.5%
" - Westbound 42.9% 38.8% 36.5% 40.3% 45.3% 49.5%

Ton Mi/Loaded Car Miles 32.6 34.8 31.9 28.7 29.5 26.5
Cars per Train 52.3 58.4 57.1 36.8 56.4 54.6
Avg Miles Hauled 227 239 226 219 563 515
Avg Train MPH 16.0 13.5 15.4 17.1 20.0 19.6

Car Mi/Car Day 45.7 31.1 40.8 48.2 79.4 70.0
% Hours Cars Moving 11.9% 9.6% 11.0% 11.8% 16.5% 14.9%

%47 Roster/Cars on Line 92.2% 91.8% 83.7% 88.1% 81.6% 102.2%
" - in. Private Cars 106.3%
%Boxcars/Cars on Line 38.6% 30.7% 42.2% 47.0% 42.1% 44.9%
%Hop.&Gons/COL 45.3% 58.1% 38.7% 32.6% 23.5% 19.3%
%Reefers/Cars on Line 1.1% - - - - 19.1%
%Other Car Types 7.1% 3.0% 2.3% 8.5% 16.0% 18.9%

Home% Total Cars on Line 34.6% 44.8% 28.0% 27.9% 37.7% 46.1%

Because of the multi-dimensions of the five railroads listed above, any
analysis should be delayed until a comparison of railroads having fewer
dimensions are analyzed.

Perhaps, the most one-dimesional of all of the US Class I railroads in
1947 was the Duluth, Messabe & Iron Range. Well over 90% of its traffic
was hauling iron ore from the Iron Ranges down to Lake Superior and
hauling the empties back to the ranges. Because of incompatible brake
systems, most of their ore jennies could not interchanged without a
transition car.

Avg RR DM&IR N&W
% Car Miles Loaded 66.4% 51.3% 58.9%
" - Eastbound 76.0% 4.6% 58.9%
" - Westbound 56.9% 97.6% 58.9%

% Loaded Car Mi - East 57.1% 4.5% 50.1%
" - Westbound 42.9% 95.5% 49.9%

Net Tons/Loaded Car Miles 32.6 54.2 47.7
Avg Miles Hauled 227 77 280
Cars per Train 52.3 97.4 77.8
Avg Train MPH 16.0 17.0 16.0

Car Miles per Car Day 45.7 23.6 58.4
% Cars Moving of Total Hours 11.9% 5.8% 15.2%

% 1947 Roster of Cars on Line 92.2% 99.8% 168.2%
% Boxcars of Cars on Line 38.6% 2.2% 26.2%
% Hoppers & Gons of Cars on Line 45.3% 94.8% 138.8%

Home % Total Cars on Line 34.6% 96.8% 77.1%

The DM&IR ran long trains over a short haul at better than an average
speed - no local switching en route. The cars that they owned were
mostly dedicated to this service - no other railroad got involved until
the ore arrived at a port on the Lower Lakes.

The N&W is shown above because it depended, albeit not as completely as
the DM&IR, upon mineral traffic - a higher than average tons per car
ratio is an indicator of heavy mineral traffic. The prime difference,
however, was that the N&W coal was delivered to other railroads for
delivery to consignee.

Because of the delays in unloading off-line, the N&W had to own a lot
more hoppers than required daily on line. The N&W's lower than the
national average of percent loaded car miles (58.9% vs. 66.4%) is a
reflection that empty hoppers were difficult to reload in any quantity
with commodities which were useful at the mines. That the 50.1% of N&W's
traffic went north into Ohio and 49.1% went east to the Coast is because
of the central location of the mines on the N&W.

Both the DM&IR and N&W had high Net Ton Miles per Loaded Car Mile
averages when compared to the national average because of their heavy
mineral traffic.

When tons alone are analyzed, mineral traffic skews much of the analyses
and comparisons with non-mineral traffickers. A case in point is the
Great Northern with its ore traffic. In 1947, GN's Iron Ore Traffic
contributed 43.8% of the GN's Total Revenue Tons, 15.0% of its Revenue
Ton Miles (short haul), 7.8% of its Loaded Car Miles (heavier tons per
car), and 10.7% of its Total Car Miles (inability to reload the ore
jennies on their trips back to the ore pits). Below is a table
separating GN's Ore Traffic from the rest of the GN - the basis of
the Iron Ore data assumes that all of it is from the haul from the
Messabe Range to Lake Superior.

1947 AVG RR TOT GN GN ORE GN OTHER
% Car Mi Loaded 66.4% 64.1% 46.7% 66.3%
" - Eastbound 76.0% 93.1% 100.0% 81.1%
" - Westbound 56.9% 46.7% - 52.1%

% Load Car Mi - East 57.1% 63.0% 100.0% 59.9%
" - Westbound 42.9% 37.0% - 40.1%

Ton Mi/Loaded Car Mi 32.6 34.5 62.7 32.1
Cars per Train 52.6 57.3 NA NA
Average Miles Hauled 227 293 100 443
Average Train MPH 16.0 15.8 NA NA

Miles per Car Day 45.7 48.5 30.0 52.4
%Hours Cars Moving 11.9% 12.8% NA NA

%47Rost of Cars on Line 92.9% 90.1% 100.0% 88.1%
% Boxcars of COL 38.6% 52.7% - 63.7%
% Hops & Gons of COL 45.3% 26.1% 100.0% 10.7%
% Other Types of COL 8.2% 11.3% - 15.7%

% Home of Total COL 34.6% 41.0% 100.0%% 28.7%

Unlike the N&W, both the GN's and DM&IR's ore businesses were seasonal.
When the ore traffic was shut down during the winter, the DM&IR's
operating statistics resembled very much the Long Island RR's freight
operations.

The Long Island's freight operations amounted to little more than branch
lines which terminated more cars than they originated (68.0% of the
loaded car miles were eastbound from the mainland vs. 32.0% westbound).
The two largest manufacturers, Grumman and Republic Aviation, had other
means to ship their finished product. Accordingly, they ran short trains
(21.3 cars per train) at slow speeds (8.1 MPH) not very far (average
haul 18 miles). The average freight car moved only 2.3% of the time and
4.5 miles per day.

1947 Avg RR LIRR B&A NH B&M
% Car Miles Loaded 66.4% 56.6% 64.6% 72.0% 72.3%
" - Eastbound 76.0% 77.0% 96.0% 91.1% 82.3%
" - Westbound 56.9% 40.8% 34.7% 53.0% 61.8%

%Loaded Car Miles -East 57.1% 68.0% 72.5% 63.1% 58.5%
" - West 42.9% 32.0% 27.5% 36.9% 41.5%

Net Ton Mi/Load Car Mi 32.6 29.8 26.3 26.0 26.6
Average Haul 227 18 123 149 150
Cars/Train 52.3 21.3 35.9 53.5 51.6
Avg Train MPH 16.0 8.1 15.6 14.0 15.1

Car Miles / Car Day 45.7 4.5 31.2 30.8 43.9
% Cars Moving 11.9% 2.3% 8.3% 9.1% 12.1%

Roster % Cars on Line 92.2% 1.4% 37.3% 33.3% 49.7%
Box % Cars on Line 38.6% - 21.4% 21.0% 25.4%
Hop&Gons % COL 45.3% 1.4% 14.4% 11.2% 21.9%
Other Car Types % COL 8.2% - 1.5% 1.1% 2.4%

Home % Total Cars on Line 34.6% 0.9% 4.2% 6.1% 10.5%

Potatoes & canned goods made up 86% of carloads originated plus whatever
LCL cars were originated. These were primarily boxcar loadings on the
LIRR. What was the source of cars for the LIRR's limited originated
traffic? The owner, PRR, would be unlikely to provide empty boxcars if
some other source was available.

Commodities terminated included coal, lumber, cement and iron & steel,
the LIRR's four largest in 1947. The number of originated carloads could
easily be accommodated in lumber boxcars after unloading and cleaning.
Having to haul empty boxcars to Eastern Long Island caused the percent
loaded of total car miles to hover around 50%.

Where was the source of that lumber? On railroads like the UP and SOU as
well as others - these railroads whose boxcar traffic normally followed
the boxcar ownership distribution on their own roads subject to a slight
bias towards home road cars.

Branch lines having seasonal traffic like the DM&IR probably had many of
the characteristics of the DM&IR in season while resembling the LIRR in
the off-season. Included in this category would be branch lines in
agricultural areas moving livestock, fruit and vegetables or grain after
the harvest.

I suspect that many of the Granger roads owned enough boxcars to insure
a supply for the Grain Rush which they thought was a surplus. Throughout
the 1946-1948 period, RAILWAY AGE reported that there were fears led by
Senator Reed of Kansas of not enough boxcars for the Grain Rush: - any
surplus having evaporated with the reloading on foreign roads, and
entering the general service boxcar pool.

To combat this problem, the Car Service Bureau would order specific
railroads to return a specified number of boxcars to interchange points
empty. These "BC" orders had bite; the B&M was fined for not complying
with an order to return empties to the NYC and CP. To help comply with
this order, the B&M accepted 500 PS-1 boxcars at Pullman's Michigan City
IN plant with these PS-1 sent to the Chicago Area for their initial
loaded maiden voyage.

The difference between the East & Westbound Percent Loaded Car Miles on
the Boston & Albany (NYC's New England subsidiary) may be an example of
how most metropolitan areas terminated more traffic than they
originated. After all, coal, when consumed, goes up in the air; food
ends up in a sewer, and steel mills have slag piles. Did the parent NYC
have similar operating statistics from the Albany Area for their Hudson
Division Line to Manhattan and the West Shore Line to Weehawken NJ? With
a favorable trade balance in 1947, more traffic was delivered to ports
for export than imports received. Would the same phenomenon occur in LA,
San Francisco or Seattle? Inland cities had a through traffic which
would hide the operating statistics characteristics similar to the B&A's
experience in 1947.

While the New Haven's eastbound loaded percent (91.1%) was less than the
B&A's 96.0%, their westbound 53.0% swamped the B&A's 34.7%. The B&A was
a linear railroad with a very limited branch network, while the New
Haven was territorial in nature having a rail monopoly in New England
south of the B&A line. Throughout the New Haven territory were
manufacturing cities where, while many raw materials were imported, at
least some finished product was shipped by rail either in carload lots
or LCL - the New Haven was one of five railroads in 1947 which
originated more than a million tons of LCL. The other four were the PRR,
NYC, B&O and SOU.

The New Haven's total roster was only a third of the total cars on line
with less a fifth of that third being on line. The bulk of the supply of
boxcars for LCL came from incoming LCL cars although some of the supply
came from emptied boxcars carrying carloads of which there was an ample
supply. LCL was a major contributor to the high percentage of loaded car
miles throughout the nation.

The prime difference between the B&M and New Haven besides size was that
the B&M was the conduit for traffic to or from Maine - major commodities
produced in Maine were paper and potatoes.

Based upon a model of B&M's freight car utilization using operating and
freight statistics in 1946-1948 era, the percentages of cars on line by
car type are estimated to be roughly the following:

Total Cars on Line 12,373 100%
B&M Cars on Line 1,305 11%
Foreign Cars on Line 11,068 89%
12/31/1947 Roster 6,141 50%

Cars on Line - Estimate 12/31/1947
1947 B&M Foreign Total Roster%COL
Boxcars 1% 54% 55% 25.4%
Hoppers 7% 18% 25% 9.5%
Gondolas 2% 6% 8% 12.2%
Reefers <1% 5% 5% 0.2%
Tank Cars - 5% 5% -
Flat Cars <1% 2% 2% 2.0%
Stock Cars <1% <1% <1% 0.1%
Covered Hoppers <1% <1% <1% 0.2%
Pulpwood Racks <1% <1% <1% 0.2%
Total 11% 89% 100% 49.7%

(NOTE - Estimate above is for all of the B&M. Around Boston, the home
road percentages would be higher than those on the West End around
Mechanicville, the largest interchange point on the B&M.)

The B&M required their own hoppers in order to load Pocahontas coal
brought to New England by ship for consignees and B&M engine terminals
inland. There were some gondolas which were transferred temporarily to
MOW service, some of which remained being treated as cars on line.

That does not leave many B&M boxcars to be on line. It was not unusual
for a B&M boxcar to be away from home for four years - the B&M boxcar
yo-yoing around the country with loads originated and terminated on
other roads. To supply boxcars for originated loads, the B&M had to use
empties - too many which caused the "BC" order. These boxcars came from
the national pool which included, by the way, the 500 PS-1 the B&M
acquired in 1947 as well as more than 2,000 other B&M boxes. The B&M
owned 0.4% of the total boxcars nationally; still, there was the home
road bias of B&M boxcars at home being roughly 2% (1 in 55) vs. the 0.4%
(1 in 250) of the national pool.

The third dimension would be the roads which specialized in the through
haul. The classic example of this would be the RF&P: - the bridge line
between the Northeast Coast and the Southeast Coast between Washington &
Richmond. Our problem is that the RF&P was not included in the OPERATING
STATISTICS until 1958. Substitutes would be the Cotton Belt (SSW) and
CNO&TP, Southern RR's bridge between Cincinnati and Chattanooga. Western
Pacific is included because their long average miles hauled put
them into this category which countered the percentage of time spent
loading and unloading cars.

AVG RR SSW CNO&TP WP
Loaded Car Mi% Total 66.4% 75.9% 77.6% 77.4%
" - Eastbound 76.0% 79.0% 78.1% 66.7%
" - Westbound 56.9% 72.7% 76.9% 86.9%

% Loaded Car Mi - East 57.1% 53.0% 53.4% 40.4%
" - Westbound 42.9% 47.0% 46.6% 59.6%

Ton Mi/Loaded Car Mi 32.6 26.6 26.0 29.4
Cars per Train 52.3 51.9 44.9 56.1
Avg Miles Hauled 227 371 202 449
Avg Train MPH 16.0 19.4 21.5 20.2

Car Mi/ Car Day 45.7 97.5 76.9 91.6
% Hours Cars Moving 11.9% 20.9% 14.9% 16.8%

%47 Roster/Cars on Line 92.2% 72.3% 172.9% 85.9%
% Boxcars/Cars on Line 38.6% 56.8% 72.3% 35.4%
% Hop&Gons/Cars on Line 45.3% 7.2% 98.2% 25.5%
% Other Car Types/COL 8.2% 11.9% 2.0% 24.9%

Home % Total COL 34.6% 16.8% 6.8% 41.4%

The daily average of car miles per day on all three railroads exceeded
the "average RR's" by a wide margin. Not much time was spent by the
average car loading or unloading.

73.7% of the CNO&TP's tonnage was bridge line traffic (received from
connecting RR's and delivered to others). How this translates into cars
is difficult to assess exactly, but the national average "received &
delivered" tons was less than 20%. CNO&TP's parent, the SOU, apparently
used the subsidiary's balance sheet to supply cars - this accounts for
CNO&TP's 12/31/1947 roster being 172.9% of total cars on line. In the
ORER's, all of SOU's subsidiaries were listed in the SOU's pages with no
differentiation in reporting marks.

SSW's percent of Home Cars on Line were low because the SSW did not own
many hoppers and gons. SSW's Hoppers & Gons were primarily in local
service rarely straying far from home. The WP's home road percent was
greater: - one of the reasons being a higher percentage of hoppers &
gons owned than the Cotton Belt.

The WP's net directional loaded car flow westward can be interpreted as
feeding the Bay Area's metroplex - the difference between the WP and B&A
being that the Central California agricultural area created eastbound
traffic versus the relative lack of westbound traffic on the B&A on
account of the B&M and NH garnering a greater share of the LCL
business.

Returning to the five "multi-dimensional" roads, the comparisons may be
more subtle than the subsequent roads discussed, but each have some of
the three characteristics (originating, terminating and through)
discussed
subsequently.

1947 AVG RR PRR NYC SOU UP AT&SF
% Car Miles Loaded 66.4% 66.9% 64.5% 70.2% 66.5% 67.6%
" - Eastbound 76.0% 81.6% 84.5% 83.9% 72.8% 69.0%
" - Westbound 56.9% 52.1% 45.7% 56.6% 60.3% 66.3%

% Loaded Car Mi - East 57.1% 61.2% 63.5% 59.7% 54.7% 50.5%
" - Westbound 42.9% 38.8% 36.5% 40.3% 45.3% 49.5%

Ton Mi/Loaded Car Miles 32.6 34.8 31.9 28.7 29.5 26.5
Cars per Train 52.3 58.4 57.1 36.8 56.4 54.6
Avg Miles Hauled 227 239 226 219 563 515
Avg Train MPH 16.0 13.5 15.4 17.1 20.0 19.6

Car Mi/Car Day 45.7 31.1 40.8 48.2 79.4 70.0
% Hours Cars Moving 11.9% 9.6% 11.0% 11.8% 16.5% 14.9%

%47 Roster/Cars on Line 92.2% 91.8% 83.7% 88.1% 81.6% 102.2%
" - in. Private Cars 106.3%
%Boxcars/Cars on Line 38.6% 30.7% 42.2% 47.0% 42.1% 44.9%
%Hop.&Gons/COL 45.3% 58.1% 38.7% 32.6% 23.5% 19.3%
%Reefers/Cars on Line 1.1% - - - - 19.1%
%Other Car Types 7.1% 3.0% 2.3% 8.5% 16.0% 18.9%

Home% Total Cars on Line 34.6% 44.8% 28.0% 27.9% 37.7% 46.1%

The much longer hauls of the UP and AT&SF led to having operating
characteristics similar to the so-called "bridge lines" such as the
Cotton Belt (SSW) and CNO&TP. That the AT&SF included their SFRD reefers
in their roster while the UP did not include its share of PFE was the
principal factor in the differences in the percentage of the 1947 roster
and home car at home as a percent of total cars on line. Another factor
was the UP serving as a bridge line between the SP and Chicago which
increased the miles per car day. The AT&SF had a more balanced
directional flow than the UP because:

1) The grain hauled from the Kansas could be hauled to Chicago on Santa
Fe's rails while the UP had to interchange their grain at either Council
Bluffs or Kansas City.
2) The AT&SF had a larger share of the terminating market in the LA
metroplex than did the UP.

The lower than average ton miles per loaded car mile ratio of both roads
indicates that both roads had less than average mineral traffic in 1947.
The Pennsy's tons per car ratio of 34.8, however, was higher than the
national 32.6 average. Their low 31.1 miles per car day (only 68% of the
national average) was not entirely attributable to greater
loading/unloading times in the mineral trade. The PRR owned too many
cars; within two years, their roster fell from 225,769 cars owned on
12/31/1947 to 197,397 on 12/31/1949, a 12.6% decline - 10.4% decline in
boxcars & 13.2% in hoppers & gons. Much of this decline was due to
retiring finally relics of a by-gone age. A good portion of these relics
were not used in interchange service in 1947 meaning that the home road
cars on line were "padded." Instead of the 44.8% reported, the
serviceable PRR cars on the PRR would be reduced to 39.5% and car miles
per day increased to 34.5 miles per day - still significantly different
from the national averages.

Interplaying with these averages is the fact that the PRR only
originated about a half of their total coal tonnage meaning that they
did not have the hopper supply/ownership problem that the N&W had which
led to N&W-owned hoppers & gons being in excess of 100% of the daily
average number of cars on the N&W. A lot of the PRR hoppers appear to
have been employed in the relatively short haul business which increased
their loading/unloading times in proportion to moving time in contrast
to the longer average haul of the N&W hoppers.

The large differential (38.8%) between the NYC's east & westbound
percent car miles loaded (85.5% vs. 45.7%) is less than the B&A's
differential (61.3%), but is higher than the average. This may be a
confirmation that the NYC south of Albany including New York City
originated little westbound traffic.

While 1947 was a year in which there was a car shortage, 1949 was a year
of recession which created car surpluses. By 1951, however, the economy
strengthened again partially due to the outbreak of the Korean War. The
effect upon the Average Railroad in this five-year 1947-1951 cycle is
shown in the table below - the most significant being the car miles per
car day cycle and the fluctuation in the percent of Home Road Cars on
Line:

AVG RR 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951
Percent Car Miles Loaded 66.4% 65.6% 63.7% 66.0% 66.0%
" - Eastbound 76.0% 74.1% 71.9% 72.9% 73.3%
" - Westbound 56.9% 57.2% 55.7% 59.0% 58.8%

% Loaded Car Mi - East 57.1% 56.3% 56.2% 55.2% 55.4%
" - Westbound 42.9% 43.7% 43.8% 44.8% 44.6%

Net Ton Mi/Loaded Car Mi 32.6 32.9 31.3 31.6 32.9
Cars per Train 52.3 53.8 56.2 57.9 60.2
Average Miles Hauled 227 224 228 229 232
Average Train MPH 16.0 16.2 16.9 16.8 16.6

Car Miles per Car Day 45.7 45.3 40.3 43.6 45.0
% Hours Car Moving 11.9% 11.7% 9.9% 10.8% 11.3%

% Roster/Cars on Line 92.2% 92.5% 92.0% 91.9% 92.3%
" - in. Private Cars 106.3% 106.5% 106.0% 105.9% 106.4%
% Boxcars Owned/COL 38.6% 37.8% 38.2% 38.8% 38.6%
% Hop & Gons/COL 45.3% 45.9% 46.5% 45.9% 45.7%
% Other Car Types/COL 8.2% 7.9% 7.8% 7.9% 7.9%

% Home Cars on Line 34.6% 39.4% 51.2% 42.2% 38.7%

In 1949 with the economy in Recession, there were not enough loads
available to reload foreign road empties so those empties returned home
in order to avoid per diem charges. This empty car movement is reflected
in the dip in the percent of car miles loaded. Mineral Traffic appeared
to be affected more than Other Traffic because of the decline in Net Ton
Miles per Loaded Car Mile from 32.9 in 1948 to 31.3 in 1949. Because
cars were in surplus, they were not moving causing the decline in both
Car Miles per Car Day and the Percent Hours Cars were moving.

In late 1948 in early 1949, per diem was increased from $1.15 to $1.75.
This increase, however, had minimal effect in the increase of Home Road
Cars on Line to 51.2% in 1949 because, when the economy started to pick
up again in 1950, the percent of Home Road Cars on Line began to
decrease although not to 1947 levels when there was a severe car
shortage.

The slight overall increase in the percent of Loaded Car Miles Westbound
from 1947 to 1951 is a reflection of the southern and western economies
growing faster than the northeastern one. The overall 1947-1951 increase
in Cars per Train, Average Haul and Average Train Speed may be
attributable to two factors - dieselization and less local freights
being operated - I have no way in determining how much of each.

The distribution of foreign cars on line by car type by owner will be
discussed later. In the meantime, I would appreciate any legitimate
questions, challenges and comments about this general material.

Thank You,

Tim Gilbert