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Train Schedules and the USRA
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Bill Welch
I recently acquired through eBay a Pennsylvania Railroad ad from the October 20, 1928 "Literary Digest" entitled "A New Era in Agriculture." It heralds the increase of the output of fresh fruits and vegetables and the PRR's role in transporting this increased production. One paragraph reads: "A few years ago, scarcely 10% of freight trains were on regular schedules. Today the Pennsylvania Railroad's 2900 freight trains are operated on regular schedules as dependable as those of passenger limiteds."
My question is assuming the statement is true that "A few years ago, scarcely 10% of freight trains were on regular schedules," was this lack of regular schedules the cause (or a factor at least) of the RR's inability to get the job done moving freight in WWI resulting in the creation of the USRA? Bill Welch |
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Bill,
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It may have, at least indirectly. More importantly it addressed shipper expectations. However, it is important to note that while there was an "arranged freight schedule" on the PRR, this carried no time table authority and all freights ran as extras. The freight schedule was more like "guidelines"... Regards Bruce Smith Auburn, AL On Mar 30, 2010, at 2:33 PM, Bill Welch wrote:
I recently acquired through eBay a Pennsylvania Railroad ad from the |
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Anthony Thompson <thompson@...>
Bill Welch wrote:
I recently acquired through eBay a Pennsylvania Railroad ad from the October 20, 1928 "Literary Digest" . . . One paragraph reads: "Today the Pennsylvania Railroad's 2900 freight trains are operated on regular schedules asSobering if true for the passenger business, given PRR's record, then and later, on freight service. The PFE people I interviewed stated that PRR's enormous damage claims for perishables were a condition that had been true for decades. Tony Thompson Editor, Signature Press, Berkeley, CA 2906 Forest Ave., Berkeley, CA 94705 www.signaturepress.com (510) 540-6538; fax, (510) 540-1937; e-mail, thompson@... Publishers of books on railroad history |
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al_brown03
Erie's symbol freights also officially ran extra. For the network of freights, see Crist, "Erie Memories", p 7. Employee timetables for the Mahoning Division (1944), Allegany-Meadville Division (1956), and New York Division (1957) all show nothing but passenger trains, i.e. the freights ran extra.
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On the other hand, at least some SAL through freights (at least some of them) *did* carry timetable authority. See Griffin, "All Lines North of Raleigh", pp 26-27, 64-65, 96. UP employee timetables for 1948 (UPHS reprint) also show freights. All three roads just cited carried lots of perishables in STMFCs, and Erie was famous for its perishable service. Among many citations, see Crist, p 42; and Thompson et al., "PFE", 1st ed., pp 378-380. I tend to think reliability of service had more to do with *regularity* of service, than with the presence or absence of timetable authority. An "arranged schedule" could work A-O-K if adhered to. The ad Bill cites suggests that in 1928 the PRR had recently installed an arranged schedule; if they hadn't had one before, I'd have to wonder about their service without it. And given the PRR's size, yeah, I'd suspect that may have contributed to the chaos the USRA was formed to unravel. Al Brown, Melbourne, Fla. --- In STMFC@..., Bruce Smith <smithbf@...> wrote:
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Anthony Thompson <thompson@...>
Al Brown wrote:
All three roads just cited carried lots of perishables in STMFCs, and Erie was famous for its perishable service. Among many citations, see Crist, p 42; and Thompson et al., "PFE", 1st ed., pp 378-380. I tend to think reliability of service had more to do with *regularity* of service, than with the presence or absence of timetable authority. An "arranged schedule" could work A-O-K if adhered to.Al, I'd think it was obedience to schedules, thus reliability, not "regularity." PFE people repeatedly said how fine a job the Erie did with perishable movements--unlike most eastern roads. As you say, I doubt that had to do with TTs. Tony Thompson Editor, Signature Press, Berkeley, CA 2906 Forest Ave., Berkeley, CA 94705 www.signaturepress.com (510) 540-6538; fax, (510) 540-1937; e-mail, thompson@... Publishers of books on railroad history |
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al_brown03
--- In STMFC@..., Anthony Thompson <thompson@...> wrote:
<snip> Al, I'd think it was obedience to schedules, thusReliability is what I meant. Couldn't think of the right word. -- thanks -- Al Brown, Melbourne, Fla. PFE people repeatedly said how fine a job the Erie |
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Al and Patricia Westerfield <westerfield@...>
Bill - The problems during WW1 were numerous. Chief was the Russian revolution which stopped shipments at the docks. But also the government had no real priority system for moving war material. Virtually every government ship was priority. As a result, loaded freight cars for the New York docks were backed up on sidings into Pennsylvania. Hoarding freight cars was also a problem. For example Long Island potato farmers ordered cars, filled them with potatoes and held them, waiting for prices to rise. Wilson nationalized the railroads to solve the problem but that didn't happen. On top of that the USRA increased wages substantially (caving into unions that called for the first national strike that would have literally staved thousands in the Pacific northwest) and instituting featherbedding rules and the eight hour day ( the workers had no intention of working eight hours but kept working ten hours with time and a half, again increasing wages. Finally, the USRA had to pay the railroads a set return on their investment realized that it was screwing itself and gave the railroads the first general rate increase in over ten years. Even so, as I recall the net result was a loss of about sixty million dollars for the railroads. With the return to private ownership the ICC was instructed to set freight rates so that the railroads would make a six percent profit. They never did. Even in the boom years of the roaring 'twenties the most roads made in a year was four percent. Little wonder that the railroads went bankrupt in the Depression. The government had been killing them for twenty years. - Al
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----- Original Message -----
From: Bill Welch To: STMFC@... Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 2010 2:33 PM Subject: [STMFC] Train Schedules and the USRA I recently acquired through eBay a Pennsylvania Railroad ad from the October 20, 1928 "Literary Digest" entitled "A New Era in Agriculture." It heralds the increase of the output of fresh fruits and vegetables and the PRR's role in transporting this increased production. One paragraph reads: "A few years ago, scarcely 10% of freight trains were on regular schedules. Today the Pennsylvania Railroad's 2900 freight trains are operated on regular schedules as dependable as those of passenger limiteds." My question is assuming the statement is true that "A few years ago, scarcely 10% of freight trains were on regular schedules," was this lack of regular schedules the cause (or a factor at least) of the RR's inability to get the job done moving freight in WWI resulting in the creation of the USRA? Bill Welch |
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railwayman <stevelucas3@...>
Al--
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I must very respectfully disagree with you on a number of points. A well-known and equally well-documented major contributing factor to the North American rail industry's woes for many years, including the time frame you cite, was the number of unprofitable branch lines and passenger services that they were mandated to continue operating. Politics, pure and simple. Branchlines and many passenger services were glorified pork-barrel projects for which the railroad companies paid, not the taxpayer. As for the rail union issue, just what kind of managerial incompetence does it take to lose money in an industry where a large part of their workforce (train and engine crews) could be made to work 16 hours at a time? When the US Hours of Service Act was enacted, railroads had to build new yards because they could not get a train over the road in 16 hours. This speak more to the incompetence of railroad management of the time, than to any "power" that rail unions had. Steve Lucas. --- In STMFC@..., "Al and Patricia Westerfield" <westerfield@...> wrote:
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I'd like to know more about 2900 scheduled freight trains! I know
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the SP had -some- scheduled freights, but most freights ran as extras. And of course the number of daily freights was nowhere near 2900 on the SP. Some railroads have tried (and failed) to run fully scheduled systems in the modern era (i.e. last 20 years). CSXT even tried to run all freights at a constant speed (30 mph) thinking that would simplify train operations and eliminate yard congestion. It was a total failure. It's fun to pick on PRR but the traffic density on the PRR (especially east of Pittsburgh) dwarfed anything on western railroads, or the Erie for that matter. Average freight train speed west or east was less than 20 mph in that era so a "full day" freight train might get 500 miles over the road... For the SP and other long haul roads that was fine and easy, that was basically the distance between major terminals. For the PRR, 500 miles meant 1/2 the maximum distance of the system and meant encountering 2 or 3 major terminals enroute. Density matters! Tim O'Connor I recently acquired through eBay a Pennsylvania Railroad ad from the |
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Gatwood, Elden J SAD
Tim and all;
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I think it was wishful thinking that they were all scheduled, but I would not be too quick to dismiss the number of trains. The Mon Division alone ran dozens. All the ex-PRR guys I've talked to agree that, while there were published schedules with freight trains on them, like Bruce said, freights were almost always run as extras; the system had to have flexibility to handle the kind of train density you mention. And we are talking density like no one can comprehend in this day and age. WW2 must've been an incredible lesson in how to run a railroad. There were also good reasons for the PRR to have had the kind of complicated trackage and interlockings they had. Density. That being said, the PRR did run trains in certain slots, pre-designated by that schedule. A "for instance" would be all the "symbol" freights they ran (like MA-50/51 and PT-6/7), in areas with a lot of industry, mostly at night, to avoid stumbling over all the locals and such running during the day, crossing the mains and creating tie-ups. Most of the trains in my area of interest ran during these time slots to avoid one another, and to provide for sufficient time and capacity at intervening yards, for setting out blocks and allowing for switch crews to keep things clean. I have also been doing research on Pennsy trains, schedules and actual operations for some time, and have some very interesting breakdowns of traffic for 1918, 1935, the 50's and 60's. What really interested me were the details of what pops out vis-à-vis interchange, actual times running, number of trains, and figuring out why they did what they did. Another is the disappearance of stations, team tracks, branches, and industries over time. If anyone is interested in more detail, just ask. Elden Gatwood -----Original Message-----
From: STMFC@... [mailto:STMFC@...] On Behalf Of Tim O'Connor Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2010 6:33 PM To: STMFC@... Subject: [STMFC] Re: Train Schedules and the USRA I'd like to know more about 2900 scheduled freight trains! I know the SP had -some- scheduled freights, but most freights ran as extras. And of course the number of daily freights was nowhere near 2900 on the SP. Some railroads have tried (and failed) to run fully scheduled systems in the modern era (i.e. last 20 years). CSXT even tried to run all freights at a constant speed (30 mph) thinking that would simplify train operations and eliminate yard congestion. It was a total failure. It's fun to pick on PRR but the traffic density on the PRR (especially east of Pittsburgh) dwarfed anything on western railroads, or the Erie for that matter. Average freight train speed west or east was less than 20 mph in that era so a "full day" freight train might get 500 miles over the road... For the SP and other long haul roads that was fine and easy, that was basically the distance between major terminals. For the PRR, 500 miles meant 1/2 the maximum distance of the system and meant encountering 2 or 3 major terminals enroute. Density matters! Tim O'Connor I recently acquired through eBay a Pennsylvania Railroad ad from the |
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Elden
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I was not at all dismissive of the number of PRR trains. But a little table napkin math, 2900 trains for say 5,000 miles of railroad, would be almost 60 train originations for every 100 miles of line. That kind of density of freight trains is unthinkable for western railroads -- to say nothing at all of PRR's passenger train density, which also was far greater than most places in the western US. PRR may have had some difficulty keeping perishables on time (haven't seen any objective evidence of this, just hearsay and anecdotes) but I tend to doubt any other management would have done much better given the volumes of traffic on the PRR. Better to ask: If SP and AT&SF were so much better run, how come their average freight train speeds in those wide open spaces were only a few MPH faster than the plodding PRR? Tim O'Connor Tim and all; |
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Gatwood, Elden J SAD
Tim;
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No, I did not think you were being dismissive, as I too, have a hard time wrapping my arms around that one. And we are provided no context for that statement; per week? Per month? And to say that the PRR had standardized (ha) all freight trains again sounds like an advertisement. I have documents that do make one wonder, however, how they managed (logistically and managerially) to have 4 trains passing one another in the same reach of track at the same time, so at a minimum, we know that had an awful lot of trains running over certain stretches of track. I also even question any speeds associated with PRR trains, as movies and personal observations just didn't bear it out. The PRR was sloooooow in my part of the country. It wasn't just slow speed restrictions. Why? Drag freights; 10-15 mph; lots of them; outnumbered anything that might have had a sense of urgency, like mail or LCL or Time Freight. We just hear a lot about the 100-mph+ T-1 runs! And yes, there is documentation in the files from shippers that berated the PRR on their on-time performance and condition once arrived. I can fully believe the SP and ATSF were faster. The PRR might have been the worst of those delivering produce, but a definitive study awaits, and I'm not sure that data still exists. But one thing: even if you tack a string of reefers on the front of a fast freight, coupling damage and sitting around in a yard after the string has been broken up will more than make up for any improvements you might have made over the road. Now you got me thinking about a trip to Lewistown... Elden Gatwood -----Original Message-----
From: STMFC@... [mailto:STMFC@...] On Behalf Of Tim O'Connor Sent: Thursday, April 01, 2010 10:14 AM To: STMFC@... Subject: [STMFC] Re: Train Schedules and the USRA Elden I was not at all dismissive of the number of PRR trains. But a little table napkin math, 2900 trains for say 5,000 miles of railroad, would be almost 60 train originations for every 100 miles of line. That kind of density of freight trains is unthinkable for western railroads -- to say nothing at all of PRR's passenger train density, which also was far greater than most places in the western US. PRR may have had some difficulty keeping perishables on time (haven't seen any objective evidence of this, just hearsay and anecdotes) but I tend to doubt any other management would have done much better given the volumes of traffic on the PRR. Better to ask: If SP and AT&SF were so much better run, how come their average freight train speeds in those wide open spaces were only a few MPH faster than the plodding PRR? Tim O'Connor Tim and all;switch crews to keep things clean.
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Anthony Thompson <thompson@...>
Tim O'Connor wrote:
PRR may have had some difficulty keeping perishables on time (haven't seen any objective evidence of this, just hearsay and anecdotes) . . .Two different retired PFE people told me, in separate interviews on different dates, that their avoidance of PRR for perishables arose from PRR's damage claims, which they asserted were the highest of any Class I, per TON-MILE. This may only mean that this assertion was "common legend" among PFE management, but after all, it was the business they were in and I would certainly doubt they made it up. Whether ICC or AAR collected these data, or have them archived, I don't know, but if you want "objective" data, feel free to go seek it. Better to ask: If SP and AT&SF were so much better run, how come their average freight train speeds in those wide open spaces were only a few MPH faster than the plodding PRR?Perishables are not average freight, Tim, and that may have been precisely what PRR's blind spot was: they couldn't or flat out didn't believe it. Tony Thompson Editor, Signature Press, Berkeley, CA 2906 Forest Ave., Berkeley, CA 94705 www.signaturepress.com (510) 540-6538; fax, (510) 540-1937; e-mail, thompson@... Publishers of books on railroad history |
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Bill Welch
The comments my message generated have been interesting and at times amusing, but except for a couple of points, I don't think I saw an answer to the question "Was this lack of regular schedules the cause (or a factor at least) of the RR's inability to get the job done moving freight in WWI resulting in the creation of the USRA? But it sounds like the answer may be "No."
Bill Welch |
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railwayman <stevelucas3@...>
While I so very respectfully disagree with some of Al Westerfield's points in his posting regarding rail labour, he did a very good job of outlining the problems US railroads faced in WWI.
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Canadian National Railways had been formed by the Canadian government to deal with a number of bankrupt railways in Canada, and this solution appeared to be favoured to a larger extent by the US government. Valuation was taken of all railroad property in the US with an eye to nationalising the entire US rail system--many of these records have survived to become excellent research materials for modellers and historians today!--including, I'm sure, a few on this list. The rail industry had a number of inherent problems by the time the USRA took over them. Insufficient plant for the traffic offered in WWI, which called for investment that the railroads could not afford or obtain financing for to improve this situation. Money-losing branchlines and passenger services, for example. The 16-hour day for train crews (and shorter on-duty times for dispatchers and signalmen) had been imposed by the Hours of Service Act of 1907. This caused the railroads to have to make large capital investments in plant (new yards, etc.) that they could not immediately amortise. Not to mention scarcity of capital due to the financial panic of 1907. Then along came WWI to increase traffic levels and create a manpower shortage with millions of able-bodied men gone off to fight a war. To exacerbate the situation, the railroads could not raise freight rates to a sufficient extent to recover the cost of capital. Then along came the Adamson Act of 1916. This mandated a 100-mile/eight hour basic day for train crews. http://supreme.justia.com/us/243/332/case.html In 1917, the US Supreme Court ruled the Adamson Act constitutional. This imposed increased labour costs that (surprise, surprise) the railroads could not recover. With these multiple issues facing the railroads of the US, scheduling of freight trains became a very minor issue in the creation of the USRA. There were just too many other issues to address. Steve Lucas. --- In STMFC@..., "lnbill" <fgexbill@...> wrote:
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np328
Bill, finally found some time and I have been collecting paper, quite a bit of it on the topic that you and I had talked about. Some/much, covers the USRA period and should shine some light on your questions. Some of it covers schedules west coast to east coast and moving from 6th morning delivery to 5th morning.
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I cannot comment on Tony's assertion regarding the PRR, either one way or the other, as there is nothing to confirm or deny that statement. I did find comments on handing express fruit shipments to the Erie. Of info regarding the USRA, there were constant admonishments and petitions from the NP and others to the USRA to modify car edicts. And some pretty interesting reading. Here is a statement regarding the shipping of cherries from the Yakima, WA area and the speeding up of fruit shipments circa 1946. This in applies to Mr. Paine of the REA who was pushing for forth morning delivery to Chicago markets with fifth morning New York delivery: It is apparent that Mr. Paine has either overlooked or ignored the previous agreement reached with the Great Northern, Milwaukee, Union Pacific, and ourselves (NP) in connection with the handling of carload cherry shipments. Bill, I will try to gather up the paperwork and get this out to you before the summer equinox. (Only partially kidding). Jim Dick – St. Paul --- In STMFC@..., "lnbill" <fgexbill@...> wrote:
The comments my message generated have been interesting and at times amusing, but except for a couple of points, I don't think I saw an answer to the question "Was this lack of regular schedules the cause (or a factor at least) of the RR's inability to get the job done moving freight in WWI resulting in the creation of the USRA? But it sounds like the answer may be "No." Bill Welch |
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Anthony Thompson <thompson@...>
Jim Dick wrote:
I cannot comment on Tony's assertion regarding the PRR, either one way or the other, as there is nothing to confirm or deny that statement. I did find comments on handing express fruit shipments to the Erie.Remember, this is not an assertion by ME, it is a report of what I was told by PFE retirees. The transcript of my interviews has been deposited a couple of places, including CSRM, if anyone would like to read it for themselves. I should also repeat what I've said earlier, that the PFE people did not think much of the NYC or B&O for perishable dependability, either, only that PRR ranked even lower. To them, the Erie really stood out. I have heard the same from Santa Fe sources regarding SFRD shipments. Tony Thompson Editor, Signature Press, Berkeley, CA 2906 Forest Ave., Berkeley, CA 94705 www.signaturepress.com (510) 540-6538; fax, (510) 540-1937; e-mail, thompson@... Publishers of books on railroad history |
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Richard Hendrickson
On Apr 2, 2010, at 12:42 PM, Anthony Thompson wrote:
Jim Dick wrote:I will add that written instructions have survived advising Santa FeI cannot comment on Tony's assertion regarding the PRR, either oneRemember, this is not an assertion by ME, it is a report of agents to ship perishables east of Chicago via the Erie and GTW if possible and to use the PRR only as a last resort. I don't know if I have copies of them, but I've seen them, and I'm thoroughly persuaded that SFRD thinking and policy in this matter was the same as that of PFE. Why there are still those who doubt this, or what their motivation might be, I can't imagine. In any event, the PRR's atrocious loss rate on perishables is well documented in the ICC archives, so it's small wonder that the western RRs didn't want the PRR handling perishable shipments if there was an alternative. The reluctance to understand and accept this well established history is difficult to understand. Richard Hendrickson |
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Allen Rueter
Richard,
Are there any notes on preferred routes for perishables to Detroit Union Produce Terminal? (GTW went to Detroit, but it would of been a transfer run down to DUPT). -- Allen Rueter StLouis MO ______________________________ From: Richard Hendrickson <rhendrickson@...> To: STMFC@... Sent: Fri, April 2, 2010 6:54:31 PM Subject: Re: [STMFC] Re: Train Schedules and the USRA 8< I will add that written instructions have survived advising Santa Fe agents to ship perishables east of Chicago via the Erie and GTW if possible and to use the PRR only as a last resort. I don't know if I have copies of them, but I've seen them, and I'm thoroughly persuaded that SFRD thinking and policy in this matter was the same as that of PFE. Why there are still those who doubt this, or what their motivation might be, I can't imagine. In any event, the PRR's atrocious loss rate on perishables is well documented in the ICC archives, so it's small wonder that the western RRs didn't want the PRR handling perishable shipments if there was an alternative. The reluctance to understand and accept this well established history is difficult to understand. Richard Hendrickson |
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water.kresse@...
The PRR ran right north of the PMs Rougemere Yard, which had a re-icing platform . The Rougemere yard would switch C&O produce coming up from Columbus, Ohio, into the Detroit Union Produce Terminal in the early mornings.
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Al Kresse ----- Original Message -----
From: "Allen Rueter" <allen_282@...> To: STMFC@... Sent: Saturday, April 3, 2010 3:09:33 PM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern Subject: Re: [STMFC] Re: Train Schedules and the USRA Richard, Are there any notes on preferred routes for perishables to Detroit Union Produce Terminal? (GTW went to Detroit, but it would of been a transfer run down to DUPT). -- Allen Rueter StLouis MO ______________________________ From: Richard Hendrickson <rhendrickson@...> To: STMFC@... Sent: Fri, April 2, 2010 6:54:31 PM Subject: Re: [STMFC] Re: Train Schedules and the USRA 8< I will add that written instructions have survived advising Santa Fe agents to ship perishables east of Chicago via the Erie and GTW if possible and to use the PRR only as a last resort. I don't know if I have copies of them, but I've seen them, and I'm thoroughly persuaded that SFRD thinking and policy in this matter was the same as that of PFE. Why there are still those who doubt this, or what their motivation might be, I can't imagine. In any event, the PRR's atrocious loss rate on perishables is well documented in the ICC archives, so it's small wonder that the western RRs didn't want the PRR handling perishable shipments if there was an alternative. The reluctance to understand and accept this well established history is difficult to understand. Richard Hendrickson [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] |
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