WWII oil transport
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Paul Doggett
Steve
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That’s a great photo. Paul Doggett. England 🏴 On 27 Jul 2022, at 16:38, Steve Stull via groups.io <winslow7076@...> wrote:
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Steve Stull
Spectacular pictures of the car ferry Detroit are available on Shorpy. This one makes me shiver just looking at it, and I work in the Arctic :) Detroit. https://www.shorpy.com/node/10514 Enjoy Steve Stull winslow7076
On Wednesday, July 27, 2022, 04:37:51 AM AKDT, Gary Roe <wabashrr@...> wrote:
Tim, They used car ferries. In the WWII era, they had three. The "Detroit" with 26 car capacity, the "Manitowoc" with 30 car capacity, and the "Windsor" with 31 car capacity. gary roe quincy, illinois |
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Gary Roe
Tim, They used car ferries. In the WWII era, they had three. The "Detroit" with 26 car capacity, the "Manitowoc" with 30 car capacity, and the "Windsor" with 31 car capacity. gary roe quincy, illinois
On Wednesday, July 27, 2022 at 07:17:57 AM CDT, Tim O'Connor <timboconnor@...> wrote:
Gary how did Wabash get cars across the Detroit River into Windsor Ontario ? Did they use the rail tunnel, or car ferries ? On 7/26/2022 6:51 PM, Gary Roe wrote: Tim,
Yes, it would have to be.
That is the only way the Wabash had of getting
to the Fort Erie/Buffalo area.
gary roe
quincy, illinois
On Tuesday,
July 26, 2022 at 08:24:43 AM CDT, Tim O'Connor
<timboconnor@...> wrote:
Even more interesting than the tank cars is that PRR->Wabash->PRR route (through Ontario, Canada, I guess?) On 7/25/2022 7:51 PM, Chet wrote: -- Tim O'Connor Sterling, Massachusetts |
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Gary how did Wabash get cars across the Detroit River into Windsor Ontario ? Did they use the rail tunnel, or car ferries ? On 7/26/2022 6:51 PM, Gary Roe wrote:
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Tim O'Connor Sterling, Massachusetts |
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Gary Roe
Tim, Yes, it would have to be. That is the only way the Wabash had of getting to the Fort Erie/Buffalo area. gary roe quincy, illinois
On Tuesday, July 26, 2022 at 08:24:43 AM CDT, Tim O'Connor <timboconnor@...> wrote:
Even more interesting than the tank cars is that PRR->Wabash->PRR route (through Ontario, Canada, I guess?) On 7/25/2022 7:51 PM, Chet wrote: -- Tim O'Connor Sterling, Massachusetts |
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Kenneth Montero
Friends,
This contemporaneous publication on World War II and rubber should be interesting:
Ken Montero
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Philip Dove
Sarnia, Ontario, at the North end of the Railway Tunnel from Port Huron Michigan. Started pre 1941to develop plants, and processes for making synthetic rubber, assuming this used oil did they use American oil, where would it have from. Sarnia was sited immediately adjacent to the world's oldest continually exploited oil field but l beleive it's output was always modest. |
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Gerry Fitzgerald
Hi All,
I have used “A History of the Petroleum Administration for War, 1941-1945” (published by the U.S. Petroleum Administration for War, Washington, 1946) in classes, seminars, and in clinics and it is very interesting. The charts and graphs alone make it a useful historical document. Some of the later charts also show the "movement" of petroleum, gasoline and aviation fuel sources from the East coast to the West as the nation shifts from the war in Europe, as it winds down, to the preparation for the invasion of the Japanese home islands in November of 1945. I picked a hardcover copy up years ago in a used bookstore for 2 dollars To expand on Ken Montero's insightful comments on rubber production, see Gregg Mitman's wonderful new book Empire of Rubber: Firestone’s Scramble for Land and Power in Liberia. which came out in 2019. Also keep the comments coming as I ma learning a great deal and changing future talks and classroom lectures. Best, Gerard |
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Larry Goolsby
Gerry, great to see your post. I badly want to catch up with you, it's been a long time, specifically about your idea of an article on oil drilling in south-central Florida for Lines South. Please contact me off list at editor@.... Thanks!
Larry Goolsby |
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Even more interesting than the tank cars is that PRR->Wabash->PRR route (through Ontario, Canada, I guess?) On 7/25/2022 7:51 PM, Chet wrote: --
Tim O'Connor Sterling, Massachusetts |
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Kenneth Montero
Bruce,
For one of the reasons for gas rationing and rubber supply, see: http://plainshumanities.unl.edu/homefront/rationing.html?section=homefront
I stand partially corrected: (1) gasoline rationing to conserve rubber was only one of the reasons for gasoline rationing. (2) Also, much of the USA rubber supply came from Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), which also was taken captive in early 1942 by Japan.
East Coast refineries did have a petroleum shortage due to submarine attacks on coastal tankers,so east coast gasoline rationing occurred earlier than in other parts of the USA. That later was extended to other parts of the USA. Rubber conservation was one of the reasons, but not the only reason.
Gasoline rationing was not popular, and was imposed by the Roosevelt administration despite Congressional opposition: https://www.wired.com/2009/11/1201world-war-2-gasoline-rationing/
Bruce, here is a good article about rationing evasion: https://sos.oregon.gov/archives/exhibits/ww2/Pages/services-rationing.aspx
Ken Montero
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Chet
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gary laakso
Additionally, the US supplied its allies with virtually all of their aviation fuel with the USSR the major destination.
Gary Laakso Northwest of Mike Brock
From: main@RealSTMFC.groups.io <main@RealSTMFC.groups.io> On Behalf Of Bruce Smith
Sent: Monday, July 25, 2022 1:09 PM To: main@RealSTMFC.groups.io Subject: Re: [RealSTMFC] WWII oil transport
Ken,
I do not believe that your understanding is correct. A number of years ago, Frank Peacock turned me on to the book “A History of the Petroleum Administration for War, 1941-1945”, published by the U.S. Petroleum Administration for War, Washington, 1946. It is an amazing book that clarifies, glorifies, and terrifies, sometime simultaneously. The motivations and policy decisions behind US petroleum production and allocation are discussed at length. While it has been a few years since I read it (cover to cover, I might add), my recollection is that refining capacity was specifically diverted to high octane aviation fuel, and what regular gasoline that was produced was focused on supplying the needs of the Armed Forces (especially the Army). In general, the Army selected gasoline over diesel, while the Marine Corps, having diesel at hand in the ships delivering them to shore, chose diesel. This meant that there were domestic shortages of gasoline. Rubber was directly rationed, so there was no need for an indirect control.
BTW, in case you want to get all glassy eyed about “the greatest generation”, the book will help cure you of that as well. Humans (and Americans) will be what they are, and the lying cheating, and stealing around petroleum and petroleum rationing are well detailed.
Regards, Bruce Smith Auburn, AL
From: <main@RealSTMFC.groups.io> on behalf of Kenneth Montero <va661midlo@...>
Tim,
It is my understanding that the primary reason for gasoline rationing was not due to a shortage of gasoline, but due to a severe shortage of rubber for tires.
Prior to World War 2, almost all rubber came from Malayan (now Malaysian) rubber plantations. When Japanese forces captured this British colony shortly after Pearl Harbor, that source was cut off. Firestone had rubber plantations in Liberia, but were insufficient as a source of supply, and synthetic rubber capacity was very limited. To avoid running out of rubber, gasoline was rationed and speed limits reduced nationally to 45 MPH (along with rationing rubber tires) to restrict driving and, therefore, extend the life of tires, both already installed on motor vehicles and as replacement as tire wore out.
Others on this list may have more detailed information or corrections. If so, please share with us.
Ken Montero
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Ken,
I do not believe that your understanding is correct. A number of years ago, Frank Peacock turned me on to the book “A History of the Petroleum Administration for War, 1941-1945”, published by the U.S. Petroleum Administration for War, Washington, 1946. It is an amazing book that clarifies, glorifies, and terrifies, sometime simultaneously. The motivations and policy decisions behind US petroleum production and allocation are discussed at length. While it has been a few years since I read it (cover to cover, I might add), my recollection is that refining capacity was specifically diverted to high octane aviation fuel, and what regular gasoline that was produced was focused on supplying the needs of the Armed Forces (especially the Army). In general, the Army selected gasoline over diesel, while the Marine Corps, having diesel at hand in the ships delivering them to shore, chose diesel. This meant that there were domestic shortages of gasoline. Rubber was directly rationed, so there was no need for an indirect control.
BTW, in case you want to get all glassy eyed about “the greatest generation”, the book will help cure you of that as well. Humans (and Americans) will be what they are, and the lying cheating, and stealing around petroleum and petroleum rationing are well detailed.
Regards, Bruce Smith Auburn, AL
From: <main@RealSTMFC.groups.io> on behalf of Kenneth Montero <va661midlo@...>
Tim,
It is my understanding that the primary reason for gasoline rationing was not due to a shortage of gasoline, but due to a severe shortage of rubber for tires.
Prior to World War 2, almost all rubber came from Malayan (now Malaysian) rubber plantations. When Japanese forces captured this British colony shortly after Pearl Harbor, that source was cut off. Firestone had rubber plantations in Liberia, but were insufficient as a source of supply, and synthetic rubber capacity was very limited. To avoid running out of rubber, gasoline was rationed and speed limits reduced nationally to 45 MPH (along with rationing rubber tires) to restrict driving and, therefore, extend the life of tires, both already installed on motor vehicles and as replacement as tire wore out.
Others on this list may have more detailed information or corrections. If so, please share with us.
Ken Montero
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Kenneth Montero
Tim,
It is my understanding that the primary reason for gasoline rationing was not due to a shortage of gasoline, but due to a severe shortage of rubber for tires.
Prior to World War 2, almost all rubber came from Malayan (now Malaysian) rubber plantations. When Japanese forces captured this British colony shortly after Pearl Harbor, that source was cut off. Firestone had rubber plantations in Liberia, but were insufficient as a source of supply, and synthetic rubber capacity was very limited. To avoid running out of rubber, gasoline was rationed and speed limits reduced nationally to 45 MPH (along with rationing rubber tires) to restrict driving and, therefore, extend the life of tires, both already installed on motor vehicles and as replacement as tire wore out.
Others on this list may have more detailed information or corrections. If so, please share with us.
Ken Montero
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The U boat problem finally ended in 1943. That's when the rail numbers turned down. But those two pipelines only reached NY metro not Baltimore or Norfolk or Jacksonville. There were still refineries all over the place hundreds of miles away from a product pipeline that could reach the east coast. But I notice that the TOTAL in 1944 is only very slightly larger than it was in 1941. This makes me think that more oil was being transported on ocean tankers from the Gulf to Europe after 1943 thus slowing down the rate of increase to the US east coast. The numbers also show a sharp decline overall in 1942 that lasted through 1943, indicating that the railroads could not completely make up for the fall off in coastal shipping - Probably due to a shortage of tank cars, at least at first. No wonder the country had gas rationing ! On 7/24/2022 11:39 PM, Bruce Smith wrote:
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Tim O'Connor Sterling, Massachusetts |
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Gerry Fitzgerald
Hi George,
Thank you for your very gracious, encouraging, and detailed response to my earlier message on clinics. It was very nice and will encourage me to try to give more clinics in the future. Let me further contextualize my earlier message. This may be slightly off topic (?), and hopefully I will be put in the penalty box, but a few additional thoughts about clinics and railroad history, a topic that in all fairness has overlap with this wonderful site.
Model railroad clinics for me can be complicated as I have a Ph.D. in the history of science and technology, and often look and frame my clinics through a historical lens that contextualizes the past a bit differently than many modelers, although I have had more success with the RPM crowd. Giving online clinics through the Hindsight 20/20 on both WWI and water softening technology during the pandemic has been extremely enjoyable as the people watching are very positive and ask informative questions. While I like the NMRA and have been a long time member, giving what I would term a “public history” clinic on model railroad/railroad topics can be problematic, although that is more a reflection of a small vocal minority. And here I am speaking from my own personal experience and other modelers have no doubt had more positive clinic presentation experiences. A number of years ago I gave a clinic at the NMRA national in Atlanta on modeling the American Civil War and talked quite a bit about slavery, which made a small number of people violently angry. Interestingly enough, I got the same response, at an NMRA meet in Pennsylvania so trying to bring a broader historical context to clinics can be problematic regardless of location. In addition, an article I wrote while editing the LDSIG journal on modeling the Jim Crow aspects of railroad operations met with even more vitriol. So doing public history and doing “real history” -as someone once said in a derogatory manner- in the hobby can be frustrating, so these days I just do less except, for a few RPM meets. Marty McGuirk did a wonderful blog post a few years back on select people in audiences who can be less than kind during clinics and that can be discouraging which is worth reading.
Let me also note that I also agree with your position on the various model railroad historical societies and I read a number of their magazines, both online and in paper, and find them invaluable. Years ago I helped out the ACl-SAL online ‘zine and helped edit some of the early articles. While I model the C&O, I love the AT&SF, N&W, and of course the amazing Pennsylvania modeling publications. These publications include just incredible amounts of information, not to mention the models and layouts, all bringing the past to life. The editors and authors all deserve our thanks.
With respect to chemicals, oil, pipeline construction, and railroad operations during WWII, I have given a lengthily clinics on that topic from the perspective of the C&O and maybe will do more on that topic clinic wise in the future. I am also writing a new book on the environmental history of industrialization in the US during World War I and am paying special attention to railroads, the USRA and the War Industries Board, topics that some in model railroad circles may find interesting.
Let me note I very much appreciate many of the posts on this site and have learned quite a bit over the years about the “internal” history of freight car design, construction, and operations. I have what academic historian call an “external” approach to technology -all PhDs have that outlook really because of our training- which as I say looks at the past through a slightly different lens. History is my profession and I love the hobby but it is not always easy to combine the two. But I do my best and will try out some new topics and maybe give some older clinics on railroads and clinics in the future.
For those interested in a short paper that deals very much with freight car operations in NYC during WWI feel free feel free Google “Arcadia,” which is an online journal on the website of The Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society, which is Munich Germany and this article title “New York Harbor and the Vicious Circle of the Winter of 1917-1918,” Arcadia, (May 2020). A clinic version of this paper was well received earlier by the Hindsight crowd and I may submit a different version to “Classic Trains” later this year.
Sorry for the long message… and if and when I publish a chapter on chemicals, oil and railroads, I will post a link to it here. Thank you very much for your encouragement and all the thoughtful and informative posts.
Stay safe and be well
Gerard |
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CJ,
I'm not sure I'd use the term "greatly reduced". Here are some numbers:
Daily Deliveries of petroleum to the East Coast (in 1,000s of barrels)
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Tankers(A) 1,421 391 160 276 451
Tank Cars 35 627 852 646 504
Pipeline 54 121 267 663 733
(Information from Tim Gilbert, summarizing American Wartime Transportation, by J.R. Rose)
So you can see that, while 1943 was the biggest year, 1944 deliveries still surpass 1942 and were more than 75% of 1943. Tank car deliveries declined further in 1945, but were still just under 60% of the high of 1943. So, while the "big inch" pipeline
helped dramatically. the shipment of petroleum via rail car was still very common throughout the war.
Regards,
Bruce Smith
Auburn, AL
From: main@RealSTMFC.groups.io <main@RealSTMFC.groups.io> on behalf of C J Wyatt <cjwyatt@...>
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2022 12:34 AM To: main@RealSTMFC.groups.io <main@RealSTMFC.groups.io> Subject: [EXT] Re: [RealSTMFC] WWII oil transport
Big Inch Pipelines of WW II - American Oil & Gas Historical Society (aoghs.org) Jack Wyatt |
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Chet
Going back in time to 12/01/01, on message 3721, I posted the cars that were in an oil train interchanged to the Wabash from the PRR.
Chet French Dixon, IL |
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Eric Hansmann
Indeed. I would welcome this presentation for RPM-East next March in metro Pittsburgh.
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Eric Hansmann Murfreesboro, TN On Jul 24, 2022, at 11:02 AM, Chris Barkan <cplbarkan@...> wrote:
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